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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
AARON OLSEN, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 900483 
Defendant/Appellant. Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for a first degree felony. This 
court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)0) 
(1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction and final judgment entered against appellant 
in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, the Honorable Stanton 
Taylor, Judge, presiding. On August 24, 1990, appellant was found guilty by a jury 
of the offense of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony as described in Utah Code 
Annotated §76-6-302 (1953 as amended). Appellant was sentenced to a term of six 
years to life imprisonment on September 10, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed on 
September 28, 1990. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues will be presented for review in this appeal: 
1. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in refusing to exclude a 
potential juror for cause? 
2. Was appellant denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel by the failure to challenge a for cause potential juror who exhibited a bias? 
3. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by admitting an unreliable 
eyewitness identification of appellant that was based on suggestive procedures and 
limited observation? 
4. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by allowing the hearsay 
statements of alleged co-conspirators to be admitted into evidence? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There are differing standards of review for these issues. The appropriate 
standard will be described in the opening paragraph of each point in the argument. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or 
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it 
is intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes 
a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
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hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement 
is not hearsay if: . . . 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The 
statement is offered against a party and is 
(E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party 
during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 16, 1990, appellant was charged in two single count informations. 
One alleged aggravated robbery, a violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-302 
(1953 as amended). (R. 3)1 A second information alleged conspiracy to commit 
aggravated robbery, a violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-4-201 (1953 as 
amended). (R. 4) An amended information was filed on August 20, 1990, joining 
those charges. (R. 49-50) Trial commenced on August 23, 1990. At the close of 
the evidence the trial court dismissed the conspiracy count on appellant's motion. (T. 
437)2 Appellant was convicted of the offense of aggravated robbery as charged in 
the information. (R. 71) On September 24, 1990, appellant was sentenced to five 
years to life for the conviction of aggravated robbery. (R. 100) A one year 
consecutive sentence for a weapon enhancement was imposed pursuant to Utah Code 
1
"R." refers to the district court file. 
2,,T." refers to the transcript of the trial. 
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Annotated §76-3-203(1) (1953 as amended). (R. 100) Notice of Appeal was filed on 
September 28, 1990. (R. 105) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the summer of 1990, J. C. Mouille was employed as a truck driver for 
United Parcel Service (UPS). (T. 87) One of his duties involved transporting to Salt 
Lake City receipts, including cash, collected by UPS drivers from Ogden and Logan. 
(T. 91-93) Mouille would generally carry the bags of receipts and cash from the 
building to his truck between 9:30 and 10:30 p.m. (T. 91-93) On June 28, 1990, 
Mouille was carrying the bags of receipts to his truck. (T. 89) The bags contained 
over sixteen thousand dollars in cash. (T. 139, 141) As he was about to enter the 
truck, he heard a voice. (T. 94) When Mouille turned around, he saw an individual 
approaching with a gun. (T. 95) The gunman made a number of verbal threats to kill 
Mouille as he approached. (T. 98) 
Mouille was ordered to lay on the ground. (T. 99) When he did so, the gun 
man took the bags and ran down the street. (T. 100) Mouille testified that he 
watched the gunman as he ran away. (T. 99) Mouille described the gunman as being 
five-feet-four inches to five-feet-five inches in height. (T. 108) Although the gunman 
was wearing a wool hat, Mouille was able to observe that he had blonde hair. (T. 109) 
As Mouille laid on the ground, Michael Harris approached driving a UPS truck. (T. 101, 
120-121) Mouille got up, stopped Harris and indicated he had been robbed. (T. 121) 
Harris followed the gunman in his truck to a late model four door cadillac. (T. 123) 
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Harris attempted to follow the car as it drove away. During the chase, Harris heard 
two loud pops that he believed to be gunshots. (T. 123-124) Harris then lost sight 
of the car as it turned on 31st Street in Ogden. (T. 124) 
On July 2 or 3f 1990, Roy Hair, an employee of the post office in Provo, Utah, 
observed a green plastic garbage bag by a fence on the post office property. (T. 157) 
On July 11, 1990, John Lebere, a maintenance worker at that same post office 
opened the bag and discovered UPS receipts and currency pouches. (T. 163) Richard 
Harris, another postal employee turned the bag over to representatives of UPS. (T. 
170) The contents of the bag were inspected by Ron Ceyba, the district loss 
prevention supervisor for UPS. (T. 327, 344) Ceyba determined that the bag 
contained items taken in the June 28 robbery. (T. 343) However, the sixteen 
thousand dollars in currency was missing. (T. 343) Ceyba also found a business card 
for a Lee Levitt in the bag. (T. 432) The card had a hand written note on it to a 
"Troy" and a lipstick print. (T. 250-252) 
LeeAnn Levitt was interviewed about the business card. (T. 354) She told 
investigators that the card was written by her roommate, Shannon Fairbanks, on June 
28, 1990. (T. 250) The two had been out drinking and dancing that evening. (T. 
250) They stopped by the apartment of Fairbanks' boyfriend, Troy Powell, to see if 
he wanted to go to breakfast. (T. 250) When there was no answer on the door, 
Levitt and Fairbanks left the note on the back of Levitt's business card. (T. 251-252) 
Appellant's finger print was located on that card. (T. 393) 
5 
Investigators believed that the robber had inside information from UPS 
employees. (T. 331-332) Based on that belief, Levitt and Fairbanks were asked if 
they knew any UPS employees. (T. 253) They both indicated that Cary Nichols, a 
friend of Powell's was employed at UPS. (T. 254) Levitt and Fairbanks also told the 
investigators that appellant's physical description was similar to that of the gunman. 
(T. 254) Fairbanks and Levitt agreed to aid investigators by surreptitiously tape 
recording a conversation about the robbery between themselves, Powell and Nichols. 
(T. 261) Levitt testified that during the conversation Powell and Nichols neither 
admitted nor denied being involved in the robberies. (T. 263) Powell and Nichols also 
made statements about avoiding the police and leaving the country. (T. 365) 
Employees of the Ogden UPS office testified that they had seen appellant, 
Nichols and Powell at that office several weeks prior to the robbery. Mike Harris 
indicated that he observed Nichols and Powell at that facility on May 30, 1990. (T. 
127) Powell was introduced as a UPS employee by Nichols. (T. 189) Employment 
records indicated that Powell never worked for UPS. (T. 338) Lisa Adams, a clerk at 
UPS testified that she had observed appellant at the facility several weeks prior to the 
robbery. (T. 142) She indicated that she did not realize that it was appellant that she 
had observed until she saw him in court when she testified at the preliminary hearing 
about preparing the money orders that were stolen. (T. 147) Evidence was also 
introduced that the appellant had purchased about fifteen hundred dollars worth of 
clothes for himself and his daughter shortly after the robbery. (T. 305, 310) 
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J. C. Mouille, the victim of the robbery, identified appellant at trial as the 
gunman in the robbery. (T. 95) Initially, Mouille was shown a group of photographs 
that contained a picture of appellant. (T. 110) Mouille was unable to identify anybody 
in the photographic array as the robber. (T. 110) He then attended a line-up where 
he did not positively identify appellant. (T. 112) At that line-up, Mouille had two of 
the seven people step forward, Mouille then stated that if he had to choose one 
person, it would be the appellant. (T. 112-113) The first positive identification of 
appellant made by Mouille was at the preliminary hearing. At that hearing, appellant 
was the only person sitting as the defendant at the counsel table. (T. 112) It was 
also the third opportunity that Mouille had to observe the appellant and identify him 
as the robber. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court failed to excuse a potential juror for cause who had expressed 
a bias in favor of police officers. The juror equivocated when the trial judge 
questioned the juror about such bias. One of appellant's peremptory challenges was 
used to strike that potential juror. Any failure of trial counsel to challenge that juror 
for cause denied appellant the effective assistance of counsel. These errors require 
that a new trial be granted. 
The trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of 
the eyewitness identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery. The 
circumstances of the robbery indicate that the eyewitness had a limited opportunity 
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to observe and was able to give only a vague description of the robber. A positive 
identification was not made until after appellant's likeness or person was presented 
to the eyewitness on two prior occasions. These errors require either an evidentiary 
hearing to determine the admissibility of the identification or suppression of the 
eyewitness identification. 
Statements made by Troy Powell and Cary Nichols should not have been 
admitted into evidence under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The 
evidence was not sufficient to establish that there was a conspiracy. Furthermore, 
the statements made were not a furtherance of any conspiracy to commit a crime. 
A new trial should be granted as a result of this error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO EXCUSE A POTENTIAL JUROR FOR CAUSE 
WHO HAD EXPRESSED BIAS REGARDING THE 
CREDIBILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS. 
The standard of review of a failure to excuse a potential juror for cause is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 
1977). An abuse of discretion exits when the court refuses to excuse a juror for 
cause who has expressed an actual bias as defined in Rule 18(e)(10) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure and that potential juror's disclaimer of partiality is reluctant or 
equivocal. State v. Brooks, supra. However, the court of appeals has indicated that 
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when counsel fails to challenge a potential juror for cause, that error must be 
evaluated under a "plain error" standard, State v. Ellifritz, P.2d , 188 UAR 
14 (Utah App. 1992). 
The potential jurors were asked if any of them were more likely to believe the 
testimony of a law enforcement officer than other witnesses. (T. 48-49) Three jurors 
expressed such a bias relating to the credibility of police officers. (T. 49-55) Mr. 
Hodge indicated that he was employed with Clearfield City and worked with police on 
investigations. (T. 50) He indicated that he believed police officers' training would 
result in their giving a better description of an incident. (T. 50) The trial judge 
explained that the jurors would have to determine if the witnesses were credible. (T. 
54) The judge then asked if the potential jurors could be neutral and fair in 
determining the credibility of the officer's testimony. (T. 55) Mr. Creager who had 
made similar statements about police officers, indicated he did not think he could be 
fair. The trial judge excused him immediately. (T. 55) Following that action, defense 
counsel stated that he had not heard Mr. Hodge's reply. Hodge replied, "I think I can 
be neutral." (T. 56) The trial judge did not excuse Hodge for cause as he had 
previously done with Creager. (T. 56)3 The defense used its first peremptory 
challenge to strike Hodge. (R. 62) 
3Defense counsel did not specifically object to the court's ruling and did pass the 
panel for cause. (T. 65) If this court finds that the failure to object constituted a 
waiver then the issue of an effective assistance of counsel should be addressed. See 
Point II, supra. 
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This court has addressed the need to excuse potential jurors for cause based 
on expressions of bias in a number of contexts. Actual bias has been described as 
strong and deep impressions in potential jurors. State v. Lacv, 665 P.2d 1317 (Utah 
1983); State v. Moton. 749 P.2d 639 (Utah 1988); State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 
(Utah 1986). In State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981)4, the court stated, 
. . . actual bias is to be determined by the potential 
juror's state of mind. By necessity this must be ascertained 
by the expressions of attitudes, opinions, and feelings of 
the juror. Whenever the voir dire evokes a strong emotional 
response, there is posed a warning that the juror may not 
have a mental attitude of appropriate indifference to the 
party or cause before the court. In assessing this response, 
the statutory test is whether the expressed state of mind 
of the juror leads to a just inference in reference to the 
cause or parties that he will not act with entire impartiality. 
In other words, based on the juror's expressed feelings, 
attitudes, and opinions, the trial court must determine by a 
process of logic and reason, based upon common 
experience, whether the juror can stand in an attitude of 
indifference between the state and the accused. 
Furthermore, when a juror has expressed an attitude 
indicating prejudice or bias, such cannot be attenuated by 
the juror's determination that he can render an impartial 
verdict. The juror cannot be the judge of his qualifications; 
this function is the responsibility of the trial court. 
631 P.2d at 884. 
There are a number of areas in which this court has found that potential jurors 
expressed an actual bias that would require their being excused for cause. In 
Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), the potential juror in a wrongful 
4This case will be denominated "Brooks II:, herein. 
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death case expressed strong feelings against those who would attempt to collect 
money for the death of another. State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629 (Utah 1977), involved 
a drug prosecution in which the potential juror had a negative attitude about people 
who used or sold narcotics. A relationship of respect or esteem to a witness also 
requires that potential juror be excused for cause, State v. Brooks, supra. In State v. 
Ball, 685 P.2d 655 (Utah 1984), this court indicated that if a prospective juror's 
religious beliefs evidence actual bias, a challenge for cause should be granted. Finally, 
in State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473 (Utah 1987), two potential jurors in a murder case 
indicated they knew the family of the victim. One stated that she hoped that the 
association would not affect her ability to be impartial. The other felt that it would 
be difficult if the defendant was acquitted, but she could follow the law. This court 
held that since those expressions of bias focused directly on the defendant, their later 
assertions of impartiality could not attenuate the bias. 
This court has also found actual bias when there is evidence of a favoritism 
toward a particular class of witness. In Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 
1981), the potential juror in a medical malpractice case indicated that she would be 
somewhat partial toward the testimony of a doctor. The court held that to be an 
expression of actual bias. Likewise, in both State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 265 (Utah 
1980) and State v. Hewitt, supra, potential jurors indicated that they would be more 
likely to believe the testimony of police officers. This court found that such 
indications are an expression of actual bias by those potential jurors. In the instant 
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case, Mr. Hodge expressed that same bias regarding the testimony of police officers. 
This was based, in part, on an ongoing relationship that Hodge shared with police 
officers that he worked with on a regular basis. (T. 50) 
The next issue to determine is whether Hodge's equivocal denial of partiality 
was sufficient to withstand a challenge for cause. In Brooks II, supra, two members 
of the jury pool indicated that they had been victims of crimes. One indicated that 
this experience might affect his thinking or attitude about the trial. The second juror 
indicated that she was very emotional about being the victim of a robbery. She stated 
that she would probably react emotionally to the evidence. After further questioning, 
the trial judge asked if she could return an impartial verdict based on the evidence 
presented and the instructions given by the court. The prospective juror responded, 
"Okay, yes, I think I could do that." with respect to such equivocal responses, this 
court stated, 
The state of mind of these jurors, as revealed by the 
facts in this case, leads to the just inference in reference to 
the cause that they could not act with entire impartiality. 
Their reluctant disclaimers of partiality run counter to 
human nature and appear, particularly in the case of Mrs. 
Scouten, to be impelled by a desire to attain approval. The 
trial court abused it's discretion by not excusing these 
jurors for cause, [emphasis in original] 
631 P.2d at 884 
The equivocation expressed in Brooks II is indistinguishable from that expressed 
in the case at bar. When discussing putting her personal bias out of the decision 
making process, the potential juror in Brooks II, stated, "Okay, yes, I think I could do 
that". In this case, Mr. Hodge indicated that police officers are more believable as 
1? 
witnesses because they are trained observers. This was based on the fact that Hodge 
worked with police officers on a regular basis. (T. 50) When questioned by the judge 
about his ability to be fair he indicated, "I think I can be neutral." This equivocation 
had immediately followed the trial judge summarily excusing a potential juror who 
indicated he did not think he could be neutral. (T. 55) Hodge's statement obviously 
indicates a desire to attain approval by the court. Hodge's response fails to meet the 
requirement that potential jurors exhibit an attitude of appropriate indifference. The 
statement by Hodge in the instant case is indistinguishable from the "reluctant 
disclaimer" condemned in Brooks II. Consequently, the trial court committed error in 
refusing to excuse Mr. Hodge from the potential jury panel for cause. 
This court has found that the error in refusing to excuse a potential juror for 
cause is prejudicial if the aggrieved party had to use a peremptory challenge to strike 
that juror.5 In the instant case, the first preemptory challenge exercised by appellant 
was for Mr. Hodge. (T. 62) Consequently, the error in refusing to excuse Mr. Hodge 
for cause was prejudicial. Appellant's judgment and conviction must be reversed and 
a new trial ordered.6 
5Crawford v. Manning, supra; State v. Moore, supra; State v. Brooks, supra; State 
v. Bailey, supra; Jenkins v. Parrish, supra; State v. Brooks (II), supra; State v. Ball, 
supra; State v. Hewitt, supra; and State v. Jones; supra. 
6ln Ellifritz. supra, the court of appeals indicated that there must be a showing 
that, absent the error, the outcome of the trial would be different. That is an 
impossible burden to meet when the error is in the jury selection process. That is 
because there is no change in the evidence admitted or the law to apply to that 
evidence. Rather, the jury selection process affects the fairness of the trier of fact in 
13 
POINT II 
ANY FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PASSING POTENTIAL 
JUROR HODGE FOR CAUSE DENIED APPELLANT HIS 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the 
states guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwriaht. 
372 U. S. 335 (1963). In Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court 
held that the Sixth Amendment also entitles criminal defendants to effective 
assistance of counsel. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this 
court has stated, "the burden of establishing inadequate representation is on the 
defendant 'and proof of such must be a demonstrable reality and not a speculative 
matter/" Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 at 1109 (Utah 1983). 
Strickland v. Washington, supra, established a two pronged test to be applied 
to determine if a defendant has been denied his right to effective assistance of 
counsel. The court stated, 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as 
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result 
is unreliable. 
a case. Consequently, the use of a peremptory challenge to remove the questionable 
juror would be sufficient to demonstrate prejudice. 
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446 U.S. at 687. 
In State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), this court held that a 
defendant has the burden of meeting both parts of this test. In Templin the court 
noted that under the first part of the test the defendant must identify specific acts or 
omissions by counsel which fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. This 
court further noted that the conduct would not fall within decisions attributable to 
"sound trial strategy." 
In the instant case, the potential jury was passed for cause without an objection 
to Mr. Hodge. (T. 65) As was shown in Point I, Hodge expressed a state of mind 
indicating that he should have been removed for cause. The failure to request that 
Hodge be removed for cause was obviously not a matter of trial strategy as counsel 
used his first peremptory challenge to remove that same juror. The use of the 
peremptory challenge also establishes the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis.7 
Appellant's judgment and conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
POINT III 
THE ADMISSION OF THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
TESTIMONY VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. 
The appellate review of the admissibility of evidence in relation to a 
constitutionally based objection is a question of law. Such questions of law are 
reviewed for correctness, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Factual 
7See: footnotes 5 and 6, supra. 
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findings that provide the basis for the determination of the admissibility of evidence 
are viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's decision. Those findings will 
be reversed only if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, Ramirez, supra. 
Prior to trial, counsel for appellant filed a motion in limine contesting the admissibility 
of the eyewitness identification evidence. (R. 47) A hearing was held on that issue. 
(T. of 8-20-90)8 However, no evidence was taken and the trial judge indicated that 
a decision would not be made until he heard that witness' testimony. (T. of 8-20-90 
at p. 16) 
In State v. Ramirez, supra, this court discussed the procedures to be employed 
in determining the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. An analysis to 
determine the admissibility of such evidence under the Utah Constitution was also 
established. That form of analysis was substantially different than that employed in 
a federal constitutional analysis. The court noted that the procedure to be employed 
is analogous to the determination of the voluntariness of a confession. 
With respect to those procedures, the court stated, 
The burden of demonstrating the admissibility of the 
proffered evidence is on the prosecution. It must lay a 
foundation upon which the trial court can make any 
necessary preliminary factual findings and reach any 
necessary legal conclusions. 
"T. of 8-20-92" refers to the transcript of the motion hearing. 
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817 P.2d at 778. The court indicated that the jury may be making similar factual 
determinations in deciding guilt or innocence. With respect to that situation, the court 
stated, 
Potential for role confusion and for erosion of 
constitutional guarantees inheres in this overlap of 
responsibility of judge and jury to determine the same 
issue. Because the jury is not bound by the judge's 
preliminary factual determination made in ruling on 
admissibility, the trial court may be tempted to abdicate its 
charge as gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize proffered 
evidence for constitutional defects and may simply admit 
the evidence, leaving all questions pertinent to its reliability 
to the jury. But courts cannot properly sidestep their 
responsibility to perform the required constitutional 
admissibility analysis. To do so would leave protection of 
constitutional rights to the whim of a jury and would 
abandon the courts' responsibility to apply the law. 
817 P.2dat 778. 
In this case, appellant made the requisite motion, but no evidentiary hearing 
was conducted. It was the state's burden to demonstrate the admissibility of the 
evidence, State v. Ramirez, supra. The failure of the state to produce the evidence 
once the issue was raised was error.9 The position of the trial court in not ruling on 
9The deputy county attorney took the position that the reliability of eyewitness 
identification is not a matter of suppression. He stated, 
[Mr. Daroczi]. . The defendant is identified, and at the 
preliminary hearing the victim said this—this man is the one 
who held the gun on me. It's-although i t 's-we had some 
problems, it was less than a positive identification when 
there was a photographic line-up, and, also, there was a 
physical line-up. There was some hesitation. The 
defendant-the victim had-had narrowed it down to two 
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the motion is simply the type of abdication of responsibility that was condemned in 
Ramirez. At minimum, this court should remand the case to the district court for such 
a hearing and order the trial judge to enter appropriate factual findings. 
The eyewitness identification evidence also fails to meet the test for reliability 
required by Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution as established in Ramirez. In 
that case, the court rejected the five part federal analysis established in Neil v. 
Biaaers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).10 This court noted in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986), that several of the criteria relied upon in Biggers should be rejected 
because they were based on assumptions that were contradicted by well accepted 
empirical studies. The court then relied upon the factors described in the proposed 
jury instruction in Long to provide the basis for the Article I, Section 7 analysis.11 
The court in Long considered four basic factors: (1) the witness' opportunity to 
observe the criminal actor; (2) The witness' capacity to observe the person 
committing the crime; (3) The witness' attentiveness to the person committing the 
and then finally picked the defendant as--as the party who 
held the gun on him. 
So I think if counsel wants to attack that for-for 
what it's worth, but I think it's more-more cross-
examination of the victim than anything else that's the 
subject of suppression. (Tr. 8-20-90 at p. 11) 
10Those factors include: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal 
at the time of the crime, (2) the witness' degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the 
witness' prior description, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at 
the confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 
11That instruction is set out in its entirety in the addendum. 
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crime; • • ' tAX Whether the identi i u.c witness"1 own 
With respect to the question rx *he capacity am/ • • ' lt,l " ' f "••"•<"», the 
court in Rodriguez descriL siderations. The court stated, 
Here, pertinent circumstances include the length of 
time tf ic witness viewed the actor; the distance between 
the witness and the actor; whether the witness could view 
the actor's face; the lighting or lack of it; whether there 
were distracting noises or activity during the observation; 
and any other circumstances affecting the witness's 
opportunity to observe the actor. 
Ti"7 P,2d at /Hz" ii 11 • i ,i i I' i i ii in- mhhnry victim, gave only a general 
fiw '|i!ion of the robbei. Ii U'HS base/ • limited opportunity to make tl ie 
observation. Mouille indicated that f and saw a man 
crosi.1 «JI 11 in sin"" i |i i his hand. ( I 91 , Mouille w^s aoie fo ohservp +he 
gunman „ i ce as he approached then backed awaw r 
feet of Mouille • • i u u « -• urn • • ' . ini • A/as dark
 v ^ ^ 109) and the 
rriinni! r uniinnoiiKiy threatened to kill Mouille. (7. 98 Mouille stated that the robber 
was wearing a hat that partially covered ^ id see that 
the ic * } I IC also described the robber as being five-foot-
four inches to five-foot-five-inches in height and weighing about MM) iiiiurifk 11 108, 
113) The testimonv indicate the length of time that 
h floi lille observed the robber \,„, *-*p eccru - er on what the lighting conditions 
were at that time. Tbp record is also unclear MM uiiin'ii i i UrniM I rnj i i i . 
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The second factor, the witness' capacity to observe the person committing the 
offense, includes such considerations such as stress or fright, visual defects and 
fatigue or injury. The record does not indicate that Mouille suffered from fatigue or 
visual defects. However, the robbery must have been a very stressful situation. 
Mouille was held at gunpoint (T. 95) and the robber made threats to kill him. (T. 98) 
The third factor, the witness' attentiveness, involves considerations of the witness' 
awareness that a crime was being committed, State v. Ramirez, supra. Mouille was 
the victim of the robbery. There is no question that he was aware of that fact. He 
also testified that he attempted to look at the robber to make an identification. (Tr. 
99) 
The fourth factor discussed in Long is of critical importance to this case. That 
factor involves an evaluation of whether the witness' identification of appellant was 
completely the product of his own memory. In Ramirez this court described 
considerations important to this factor; 
Here, relevant circumstances include the length of 
time that passed between the witness's observation at the 
time of the event and the identification of defendant; the 
witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of 
the identification; the witness' exposure to opinions, 
descriptions, identifications, or other information from other 
sources; instances when the witness or other eyewitness 
to the event failed to identify defendant; instances when 
the witness or other eyewitnesses gave a description of the 
actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the 
circumstances under which defendant was presented to the 
witness for identification. 
817 P.2dat783. 
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In this case, Mouille was * oetime a;to. w~./ 14, 
*>6) The II h\)V / occurred on June 28, 1990. ( I . 88) In that photographic 
array appellant \\-as the only person without racial . 
Later, Mouille cmeucieu ci uneup with seven people . * M . • 
identification to two people, one oi "m *i r ' * ^u ihe line-up, 
M he had to choose one person ho would pick appellant, 
but his identification was not positive a that time, f'l I I , I le 
reason lor his equivocation u', :;haf /ippMlnnt did not have the same physical build 
as the robbei { I 1 15) The record does not indicate that any of the individuals fi oi i \ 
the photographic array, other than the appen \ '"i.,"<i" -<IM H""11 I' »' "|.«. Mouille did 
H unui the preliminary hearing when appellant was 
sitting in the courtroom at counsel table, f"1" 1 1 
court at the trial. ("1 'JM 
The procedure used in this case allowed Mouille to observe appellant repeatedly 
before a positive identification was made was rnade in the 
coui t:i ooi i i wl lei i appellai vt was the only suspect seated at counsel table, Such 
procedures indicate :\ < f the identification : " °o , irt was ' r "", ? 
own recollection ned with the initial vague description 
of the robber and the circumstances under which Mouille made the observations 
require suppression of the identificatio Id be ordered 
because the only other evidence to connect appellant with the crime was a fingerprint 
on the card found with the UPS property in July. That evidence fails to show that 
appellant committed the robbery. In the alternative, this court should require that an 
evidentiary hearing be held consistent with the procedures described in Ramirez. 
Based on that hearing, the district court judge should be required to make findings 
relative to the factors described in Ramirez and determine if a new trial is required. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION TO ADMIT 
HEARSAY AS STATEMENTS OF COCONSPIRATORS, 
FURTHERMORE, THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT MADE IN 
FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY. 
Several statements of Cary Nichols were admitted against the defendant as 
statements made during the course of a conspiracy.12 Counsel objected to the 
admission of those statements. (Tr. 188, 214) This court has indicated that a 
"clearly erroneous" standard should be employed in reviewing claimed errors in 
admitting such evidence, State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986). 
In Gray, the court addressed the analysis to be employed in dealing Rule 
801(d)(2)(E) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.13 The court stated, 
12Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
13That rule provides: 
A statement is not hearsay if . . . the statement is offered 
against a party and is . . . a statement by a coconspirator 
of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
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To utilize the exceptioi 1, the State must introduce 
evidence independent and exclusive of the conspirator's 
hearsay statements themselves, showing the existence of 
a criminal joint venture and the defendant's participation 
therein i Independent evidence of the declarant's 
membership in the criminal venture is also required. 
"Otherwise, hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps 
to the level of competent evidence." [footnotes omitted] 
, . . : y ! - :v~ + ^ ~ ^ n a r c p y / Q THSSJble 
because T ^ W w • u,t oviispiraw,. : urthermore, there 
v vas insufficient proof of any agreement to commit a crime to provide the tuundwliiMi 
for the use of this exception ^ . 
roups of statement ' " "- case made 
by the two alleged co-conspirators. I hi* first statemen' Nichols 
about six weeks beton ill i a " " 'ne^ml employees had seen Nichols at 
Ogden UPS facility. I le was w4;:. : :oy Powell. Nichols told UPS ei i iployees in 1. . 
that he was training Powell ° new I u \\ that he was in 
Ogdt i OVJ, 196-199) One employee found that to be 
strange. ('" IBtif i he second statement was made by Nichols se 
the June 28, 11,1:1 \ 1 uiiiiei ' - 11 \ .p; I ' 1 ;i 1 "<Pr employee in Salt Lake City, Janet Terry. 
216-217) Terry was putting a bag ml quarters into a safe near Nichols iJi.sk, 
Nichols asked her where the money was pn.-h'ii up i I I I mriey was in the 
14ln Bouriailv v. United States. 483 US 
to consider the coconspirator's stateme? \ 
that conspiracy. 
* -
,
" '1987), the Court allowed trial courts 
- ™
:
-
:
~a the existence and scope of 
safe. She told him that Wells Fargo would bring in the money and about $600 was 
kept in the safe. She found this to be an unusual conversation. (T. 217) The final 
group of statements were made to LeeAnn Levitt and Shannon Fairbanks after these 
two had been questioned by police. Nichols and Powell told Levitt and Fairbanks to 
tell the officers the truth about their knowledge of the robbery-they did not know 
anything about it. (T. 263) Nichols and Powell also asked the two to say nothing of 
trips to Ogden. (T. 292) They then made statements about avoiding the police and 
leaving the country. (T. 365) 
None of these statements were made during the course and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. An example of what constitutes such a statement is found in State 
v. Gray, supra. In that case, the undercover agent testified that the co-defendant 
stated, "We're going out to get the dope." Later the co-defendant indicated that she 
and the defendant had to leave quickly to get the drugs. The court held that these 
statements were intended to indicated to the purchaser that the cocaine would be 
delivered soon, thus facilitating the drug transaction. The statements at issue here 
involve the reasons for taking an unrelated trip to the UPS center in Ogden, questions 
about money in a safe in Salt Lake City and advice to two potential witnesses to be 
truthful. Such statements clearly are not made in furtherance of any conspiracy. The 
statements do not indicate any participation in a crime nor do they substantiate any 
agreement to commit a crime. 
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I ike wise, the evidence a is . i, 111, > '"*, i ,i <nh. n ih d the foundational proof of a 
< Hi11- "t i , ffhf the admission of the statements. In State v. Gray, supra, the court 
discussed the proof necessary for the admission 
. . . in accordance witt i the prevailing view, thai the 
criminal venture and the defendant's participation therein 
must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Wl' ICI i applying the standard to determine whether to admit 
a co-conspirator's hearsay statements, the court may 
consider the accused's own statements indicating 1lis 
involvement in the conspiracy, as well as actions by the 
accused or the declarant. Further, although a conspirator's 
statement may be provisionally admitted, subject to 
eventual independent proof of the criminal venture and the 
defendant's participation therein, the court should hereafter 
always make an on-the-record finding of admissibility 
before the case is submitted to the jury, [footnotes omitted] 
" " ^ ~ 2d at 13*. 
* tending ' » p'ovp ;» i onspiracv was •' ~ \'ichols was an 
employee of UPS ,ne same tii i le before • weeks 
before u ^served together at the Ogden UPS depot. 
11. IUU, 196, 198) Powell, Nichols and appellant were friends and associated 
each other sociph , ented a car similar to that 
usoil in lhi i mhhiM\ ' I'i. 234-235) Appellant had bevw observed driving that cor / T 
237) Finally, appellant's fingerprint was located ' 
taken had been left in Powell's residence by his 
girlfriend on the night o * robbery ~"r" t 
These facts are not sufficient to establish that Nichols, Powell and appellant 
entered into an agreement to commit a crime. In State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 
(Utah 1989), this court found that the evidence established such an agreement. 
Witnesses testified about meetings where thee defendant had discussed drug 
distribution. Those witnesses also testified that deliveries of cocaine which they 
observed or in which they participated. Similarly, in State v. Gray, supra, the witness 
met the defendant and discussed the quality of the cocaine to be purchased. Gray 
and the co-defendant left in Gray's car and returned with cocaine. Gray then divided 
the cocaine and provided part to the witness. A similar transaction took place about 
a week later where the actions of Gray and the co-defendant were described by the 
witnesses. This court found those facts sufficient to establish the conspiracy for 
purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The evidence in this case shows, at best, that 
appellant and the others were friends and that appellant may have been driving a car 
rented by Powell and Nichols. Appellant was not with Powell and Nichols when those 
two were at the scene of the robbery some six weeks before it occurred. The 
fingerprint evidence establishes that appellant and Powell may have been together 
after the robbery, but fails to indicate that appellant participated in the robbery. 
Consequently, the evidence fails to establish the foundation for the introduction of the 
hearsay statements.15 The trial court committed error in admitting the hearsay 
15Although the burden of proof is higher, the trial judge dismissed the conspiracy 
count at the close of the evidence. (T. 437) 
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statements. Appellant's judgmei it ' d i iew ti ial 
ordered. 
C0IMCLUS10N 
i process requires that appellant's judgment and 
conviction be reversed and a new trial ordered. Likewise the o ^ ^ imitting 
eyewitness identification >ir-eni a..u 
convictioi » be reversed and a new trial ordered without the eyewitness or hearsay 
evidence being admitted ' - + u r alternative, frn; *:o 
admissibility of the eyewitness identification with 
an order that the districi c ourt judge make findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
that issue. 
DATED this ^ u y „ . -jptember, 1992. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered 
on this day of September, 1992, to: 
Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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The proposed instruction from State v. Long, 
supra, 
One of the most important questions [ ! f le only 
important question] in this case is the identification of the 
defendant as the person who committed the crime. The 
prosecution has the burder i of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt, not only iliat the crime was committed, but also 
that the defendant was the person who committed the 
crime. If, after considering the evidence you have heard 
from both sides, you are not coi ivii iced beyond 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who 
committed the crime, yoi i mi jst find the defendant not 
guilty. 
I"he identification testimony that yuu have heard wns 
an expression of belief or impression by the witnesses 
find the defendant not guilty, yoi11leed not believe that the 
identification witness was mistake.! i in his [her] belief or 
impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. 
In considering whether the prosecution has proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who 
committed the crime, you should consider the following: 
11 Did the witness have an adequate opporti inity 
to observe the criminal actor? 
In answering this questio )u should consider; 
•ii the length of time v.*) witnesses r.hsorv^u tho 
actor: 
"
u
~ distance betwee 
actor 
O ine exterit to whicf»the actor's features were 
visible and undisguised; 
d) x\ ie light or lack, of light at the plact; dn<l \ 
of observation; 
e) the presence [or] absence of distracting noises 
oi .M.in 'M jring the observation; 
1) any other circumstances affecting the witness7 
opportunity to observe the person committing the crime. 
2) Did the witness have the capacity to observe 
the person committing the crime? 
In answering this questioii, you should consider 
whether the witness' capacity was impaired by: 
a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
c) uncorrected visual defects; 
d) fatigue or injury; 
e) drugs or alcohol. 
[You should also consider whether the witness is of 
a different race than the criminal actor. Identification by a 
person of a different race may be less reliable than 
identification by a person of the same race.] 
[3) Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the 
criminal actor at the time of the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider 
whether the witness knew that a crime was taking place 
during the time he [she] observed the actor. Even if the 
witness had adequate opportunity and capacity to observe 
the criminal actor, he [she] may not have done so unless he 
[she] was aware that a crime was being committed.] 
4) Was the witness' identification of the 
defendant completely the product of his [her] own 
memory? 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
a) the length of time that passed between the 
witness7 original observation and his [her] identification of 
the defendant; 
b) the witness' [mental] capacity and state of 
mind at the time of the identification; 
c) the witness' exposure to opinions, descriptions 
or identifications given by other witnesses, to photographs 
or newspaper accounts, or to any other information or 
influence that may have affected the independence of his 
[her] identification; 
[d) any instances when the witness, or any 
eyewitness to the crime, failed to identify the defendant;] 
[e) any instances when the witness, or any 
eyewitness to the crime, gave a description of the actor 
that is inconsistent with the defendant's appearance;] 
f) the circumstances under which the defendant 
was presented to the witness for identification. 
[You may take into account that an identification 
made by picking the defendant from a group of similar 
individuals is generally more reliable than in identification 
made from the defendant being presented alone to the 
witness.] 
lYou may also take into account that identification,"i 
made from seeing the person are generally more reli*ihir 
than identifications made from a photograph.1 
I again emphasize that the burden of proving that the 
defendant is the person who committed the crime is on the 
prosecution. If, after considering the evidence you have 
heard from the prosecution and from the defense, and after 
evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light of the 
considerations listed above, you have a reasonable doubt 
about whether the defendant is the person who committed 
the crime, you must find him not guilty. 
• D I S T R I C T S 
WEBER COUHTY. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, jgEA&E 9 F 0 3 U M H ^ 
State of Utah, ) JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND ^ 
% , 
) NO. 901900449 
) 
vs. COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE 
AARON D. OLSEN ) PRISON 
Defendant. ; 
—00O00-
Defendant having been convicted by PQ a jury; [ 1 the court; [3 plea of guilty, 
[]plea of no contest; of the offense of AQ3SAVAIED ROBBER?. , a 
felony of the 1st degree, being now present in court and ready for sentence, 
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows: 
"t?als THE BASIC SENTENCE 
• •/// [ ] not to exceed five (5) years at the Utah State Prison; 
[] not less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison; 
fffe/< K not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison; 
[ ] to pay fine in the amount of $^  . 
// ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE 
,;;-; ^ T Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows: 
^ K one (1) year at Utah State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203^7)) (2) or (3) ;(Mandatory) 
„.__ J>] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3); 
y'"Xl ] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison, 
•'/•-.//—•- pursuant to 76-3-203(4); 
-..•c-^ti/ said /Sentence„tQ.run consecutiveTlo.the basissentence as set forth above. 
*/?// (X) Che XX) additional year at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203 (1) (Weapons 
r
" HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT Erihancerasnt) 
Upon a finding that the defendant is in the status of an habitual criminal, the 
defendant is sentenced to: 
[] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison. 
RESTITUTION 
[] Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ (to be detenmftqca) 
Defendant is remanded into custody of: 
P] the Sheriff of this county, for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate 
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or 
f 
w-
<*»/' &£& Warden for execution of this sentence. Sentences are to run consecutive. 
DATED this 10th day of Septenfcer, /*; , 19 90 
